Is Immigration Actually the Problem?

Beyond the Scapegoat: UK Problems and Migration

Immigration is often cast as the scapegoat for a host of economic and social challenges in the UK – from stagnant wages and scarce housing to strained public services. Politicians and tabloids, especially during hard times, have frequently framed rising migrant numbers as a "crisis" or even an “invasion”. This essay takes a deep dive into the data and history behind these claims. We will examine a century of migration to and from Britain, analyze the true causes of wage stagnation, housing unaffordability, and cost-of-living pressures, and explore how the narrative around migration has been shaped (and often distorted) by politics and media. By comparing the UK’s experience with cases like post-reunification Germany, we can reframe the core question: are immigrants truly to blame for the UK’s problems, or have systemic economic issues been rebranded as a migration crisis? The goal is to ground the discussion in facts and human dignity, making clear that real solutions lie in structural reforms – not in scapegoating those who come to Britain’s shores seeking a better life.

A Century of Migration: Historical Timeline (1925–2025)

Understanding today’s debates requires a look back. Over the past 100 years, migration in the UK has ebbed and flowed in response to wars, empire, economic booms and busts, and policy changes. Below is a timeline of key phases and events in UK immigration and emigration, with net migration figures where available, linking each era to its context:

• 1920s–1930s (Interwar Years): After World War I, Britain experienced a brief reversal of its historic emigration trend as some Britons and colonial soldiers settled in the UK. Overall, however, Britain between the wars remained a net exporter of people – many Britons left for North America or Commonwealth countries in search of opportunityresearchbriefings.files.parliament.uk. The Aliens Act 1919 imposed the first modern controls on foreign entrants. By the 1930s, amid the Great Depression, both immigration and emigration slowed.
  
  

• 1940s (Wartime and Post-War): World War II brought an influx of refugees and allied servicemen (for example, Polish and other European soldiers who later settled in Britain). After 1945, with industries facing labor shortages, the UK actively recruited workers from war-torn Europe and the colonies. The British Nationality Act 1948 made citizens of Commonwealth subjects, paving the way for the Windrush generation – starting in 1948, thousands from the Caribbean came to rebuild Britain’s economy. Net migration was modestly positive as returning soldiers and new workers arrived, offset by Britons emigrating to Commonwealth nations.
  
  

• 1950s–1960s (Commonwealth Migration and Restrictions): In the 1950s, immigration from the Caribbean, India, Pakistan, and Africa grew to staff the NHS, transport, and mills. This was a period of net immigration into the UK (although still small in absolute terms). Concern over racial change led to the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962, ending free entry for Commonwealth citizens. Further restrictions in 1968 targeted Asian Kenyans and others amid fears of large inflows. Despite this political backlash, migration continued – by 1971 about 1.4 million Commonwealth-born people lived in the UK. The late 1960s also saw harsh rhetoric: in 1968 MP Enoch Powell gave his infamous “Rivers of Blood” speech warning of social breakdown due to immigration, reflecting growing tensions.
  
  

• 1970s–1980s (Economic Turmoil and Emigration): These decades brought economic crises – oil shocks, industrial decline, and high unemployment. Immigration levels were relatively low, while many Britons left for opportunities abroad (often to Australia, Canada, or South Africa). The UK was “a net exporter of population in the 1970s and 1980s”, as families took advantage of assisted passages overseasresearchbriefings.files.parliament.uk. For example, by the late 1970s, net migration was negative each year (more people leaving than arriving). Anti-immigrant sentiment still flared as the National Front blamed immigrants for joblessness. Meanwhile, Britain joined the EEC (European Economic Community) in 1973, but migration within Western Europe remained limited due to similar economic levels and Britain’s own woes. By 1987, cumulative emigration through the century meant the UK had lost more people than it gained – a net exodus of 15.6 million since 1901researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk.
  
  

• 1990s (EU Expansion and New Arrivals): The end of the Cold War and closer European integration changed migration patterns. The Maastricht Treaty 1992 introduced EU citizenship with free movement rights. The UK in the 1990s saw modest inflows of EU nationals (for work in booming London, for instance) and welcomed refugees from conflicts like the Balkans. Hong Kong’s 1997 handover also prompted some migration to Britain. By the mid-1990s, net migration turned consistently positive – every year since 1994 more people have come to the UK than leftcommonslibrary.parliament.uk. In 1997 net migration was about +97,000researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk, a figure without recent precedent. The late ’90s economy was strong, attracting migrants, and the new Labour government took a relatively relaxed stance on immigration.
  
  

• 2000s (Record Immigration – EU Enlargement and Globalization): This decade saw unprecedented migration into the UK. Key drivers were the 2004 EU enlargement (when 10 countries, including Poland and other Eastern European nations, joined the EU) and globalization of skilled migration. The UK (unlike France or Germany) allowed immediate free movement access to workers from the new EU members in 2004. A large wave followed – for example, immigration from the “EU8” Eastern countries peaked at around 112,000 in 2007ons.gov.uk. Meanwhile, non-EU immigration also grew (students from Asia, professionals, family reunions, etc.). Net migration, which had averaged tens of thousands in the early 1990s, jumped above +200,000 per year by the mid-2000s. This coincided with a strong economy up to 2008, but also growing public unease. The 2008 financial crisis briefly slowed migration (some Eastern European workers returned home as UK jobs fell). By the end of the 2000s, net migration remained historically high, even as the economy struggled.
  
  

• 2010s (Austerity, Brexit, and Policy Shifts): The 2010s opened with a government pledge to reduce net migration to “tens of thousands,” reflecting rising political backlash. Despite tighter rules on non-EU migrants and temporary restrictions on Romania and Bulgaria (which joined the EU in 2007), net migration hovered between 200k–300k annuallyons.gov.ukcommonslibrary.parliament.uk, fueled by continued EU inflows and global migration. The Great Recession aftermath and austerity measures saw wages stagnate and public services squeezed, conditions under which some politicians doubled down on blaming migrants. In 2015, net migration hit an all-time high of about +332,000ons.gov.uk. The European refugee crisis that year added to anxieties (though the UK took in far fewer Syrian refugees than Germany did). Anti-immigration sentiment, amplified by certain media, culminated in the 2016 Brexit referendum, where “taking back control” of borders was a defining issue. After the Leave vote, EU immigration began to slow (many felt less welcome or faced a falling pound), but overall numbers stayed high as non-EU migration rose to compensate. The late 2010s also saw the Windrush scandal, a stark example of the hostile environment policies—legal immigrants from the Caribbean were wrongly targeted—illustrating how easily migrants became scapegoats in political campaigns to look “tough.”
  
  

• 2020s (Post-Brexit, Pandemic, and New Trends): The decade began with Brexit formally ending EU free movement in 2020 and the Covid-19 pandemic shutting down travel. Net migration briefly dropped during lockdowns. But by 2021–2022, numbers surged again. The government’s new points-based system opened paths for skilled workers worldwide, and special schemes admitted Hong Kong residents (over 140,000 applications in 2021-22) and Ukrainian refugees (over 160,000 visas granted after Russia’s 2022 invasion). As a result, net migration to the UK reached record levels – roughly 606,000 in 2022 (year ending Dec) according to ONS, and as high as ~745,000 by some measuresspectator.co.uk. For the year to June 2023, the estimate was an unprecedented 906,000 net migrantsfullfact.org. This rapid rise came even after “Brexit” supposedly tightened control, highlighting how global events and labor demand drive migration. Politically, however, the narrative remained alarmist. By 2023–24, both major parties were arguing that these levels are “unsustainable,” while hardline rhetoric painted asylum seekers crossing the Channel in small boats as a national emergency. The data tell a nuanced story: the UK today is undeniably a country of net immigration (a reversal from much of the 20th century), but the causes and effects of that migration need careful analysis beyond the soundbites.
  
  

Economic Analysis Part 1: Wage Stagnation – Causes Beyond Immigration

One of the most common grievances laid at the feet of immigrants is wage suppression. Many British workers have seen their pay packets stagnate, especially since the 2008 financial crisis, and some fear that competition from migrants willing to work for less has kept wages low. Is immigration really the main cause of wage stagnation? A hard look at the economics suggests otherwise – deeper structural forces are at play, and migrants’ impact on pay is relatively small.

The Reality of Stagnant Wages: After decades of growth, real wages in the UK hit a wall around 2008. Adjusted for inflation, the average worker’s earnings in the mid-2010s were no higher than in 2008. In fact, by 2023 analysts noted that “real wages haven’t seen sustained growth for 15 years”bbc.com. One study calculated that if the pre-2008 wage growth trend had continued, the average worker would be earning £11,000 more per year today than they actually dobbc.com. This lost decade (and counting) of wage growth is unprecedented in modern British history. Notably, it began with the global financial crash – before recent high immigration peaks. This timeline alone hints that broader forces (like recession and weak recovery) are the primary culprits.

Productivity and Policy: Economists largely attribute UK wage stagnation to poor productivity growth and weakened worker bargaining power. Productivity – the amount each worker produces – flatlined after 2008. Companies invested less in new technologies and training, and Britain’s productivity gap with other advanced economies widenedeconomy2030.resolutionfoundation.org. When workers aren’t producing more value, employers are less able (or willing) to raise pay. Additionally, policy choices shifted the economic playing field: since the 1980s, Britain has moved from a model of strong unions and regulated labor markets to a more deregulated, flexible model. This increased competition (including global competition) for jobs, often to the benefit of employers over employees. Crucially, trade union membership plummeted from roughly half of workers in the late 1970s to about 23% todaywiserd.ac.uk. The Bank of England’s Chief Economist, Andy Haldane, pointed out that this decline in union power is a key reason for weak wage growth in the past decadeier.org.uk. Fewer workers collectively bargaining means lower “pay pressure” on employers. Haldane estimated that the drop in unionization has cut annual wage growth by about 0.75 percentage points each year over 30 yearsier.org.uk – a significant cumulative effect. In short, weaker worker leverage = weaker wage gains.

What About Immigrants’ Impact on Wages? Extensive research finds that immigration has at most a modest effect on average wages – and mostly in specific sectors. The consensus of numerous studies (from the Migration Observatory, London School of Economics, Bank of England, and others) is that the presence of migrant workers does not significantly depress overall wages of UK-born workersmigrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk. If anything, more workers can mean more economic demand, more entrepreneurship, and thus more jobs in the long run. There is some evidence of a small downward pressure in certain low-wage occupations that saw a sudden influx of workers – for example, one Bank of England study found a slight pay dip in fields like basic services where a lot of migration occurredmigrationwatchuk.orgizajodm.springeropen.com. But even that study described the impact as “small”. To put it plainly: immigrants did not cause the decades-long wage malaise. Wage stagnation began with a financial meltdown and was prolonged by policy (austerity, low investment) and structural shifts (technology, globalization).

It’s worth noting that migrants often fill jobs Brits cannot or will not do at current conditions – from picking crops to staffing care homes – and in many cases migrant labor props up entire sectors without appreciably lowering native wages. In fact, some analyses even suggest immigration slightly increases average wages by boosting productivity and growth (as migrants start businesses or fill skill gaps)migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk. Regardless, blaming immigrant workers for low pay is misleading. The true levers of wage growth lie in economic policy: stimulating productivity, enforcing decent labor standards (so no one can undercut by exploiting cheap labor), and empowering workers to bargain. It’s notable that during the pandemic, public appreciation grew for “essential workers” – many of whom are migrants – doing critical jobs. The real question on wages is how to ensure everyone (immigrant and British-born alike) earns a decent living, rather than pitting workers against each other in a race to the bottom.

Economic Analysis Part 2: Housing, Affordability, and Population Pressures

Perhaps no issue arouses more anger in the immigration debate than housing. The UK’s housing crisis – characterized by sky-high prices, rents, and inadequate supply – often leads people to point the finger at migrants for “crowding” the country. It’s an emotive claim: every home taken by an immigrant is seen as one less for a local. But is Britain’s housing affordability crunch truly caused by immigration? The evidence strongly suggests that policy failure and market forces – not migrants – created this crisis.

Figure: Housing under construction in London. The UK has struggled to build enough homes for its population, due to planning restrictions, underinvestment in social housing, and market speculation. Even if immigration stopped tomorrow, the housing crisis would persist without major reformsiea.org.uk.

Housing by the Numbers: The affordability gap in Britain is enormous. Since 1997, average earnings have roughly doubled, but average house prices have increased four-and-a-half foldmigration.greenparty.org.uk. In practical terms, this means home ownership has slipped out of reach for many young people and renters face burdensome costs. As of the early 2020s, over a million households languish on council housing waiting lists, and more than 130,000 children are growing up in temporary accommodation or sheltersmigration.greenparty.org.uk. These grim statistics reflect a chronic shortage of affordable homes. Government analyses have identified a shortfall of about 1.5 million homes that should have been built but weren’tmigration.greenparty.org.uk. Why the shortage? In past decades (e.g. the 1960s), the UK regularly built 300,000+ homes a year, including vast council housing projects. In recent years, however, construction has fallen far below need – England built only ~171,000 homes in 2022spectator.co.uk. Local opposition to development (“NIMBYism”), restrictive planning rules, and cuts to government housebuilding subsidies (after 1980, councils virtually stopped building new homes) have all contributed. The result is a classic supply-demand mismatch: too few homes for the number of households, driving prices up.

Population Growth and Demand: To be fair, immigration does contribute to population growth, which does increase housing demand. About 14% of UK residents today were born abroad, and migration accounts for a significant portion of new household formation. But the key question is elasticity: does the housing supply respond to increases in population? In the UK, it largely hasn’t. It is far easier for politicians to blame newcomers than to admit planning failures. As one commentary noted, “even if the UK closed the borders tomorrow, there would still be a housing crisis.”iea.org.uk In fact, immigrants often make less demand on housing than natives – they are more likely to house-share or live in multi-generational households, especially upon arrivalmigration.greenparty.org.uk. Statistics show that while only 14% of UK-born people rent privately, around 37% of foreign-born residents do, and an even larger 75% of recent immigrants rely on the private rental marketspectator.co.uk (often sharing flats). This means many migrants crowd into existing housing stock rather than immediately outbidding locals for suburban semis. Over time, of course, migrants also need homes – but so do the UK-born (who themselves are living longer and forming separate households). Blaming migrants solely is a misdirection.

Over-Emphasized for Political Reasons: Research by housing economists and even the government’s own Migration Advisory Committee suggests that migration has some effect on house prices – one estimate was that a 1% population rise from migration might increase house prices by about 1%spectator.co.uk. However, this is just one factor among many. For instance, low interest rates and easy credit in the 2000s allowed property prices to balloon far more than population changes did. Moreover, in many cases migrants occupy areas and segments of the housing market that are not accessible to most locals (for example, renting crowded rooms in inner-city London). The Green Party, in a policy paper aptly titled “The housing crisis is not an immigration crisis,” argues that the impact of immigration on housing is frequently overblown for political gainmigration.greenparty.org.uk. It notes that using migrants as scapegoats “masks policy failings” in housebuilding – diverting public anger away from those in power who did not build enough homesmigration.greenparty.org.uk.

In truth, solving Britain’s housing woes requires structural fixes: building vastly more homes (especially affordable and social housing), incentivizing development in high-demand areas, clamping down on empty investment properties and speculative second-home ownership, and protecting tenants from exploitation. These solutions are hard and often politically contentious. Simply reducing immigration is a much easier soundbite – but it would be largely ineffective. In a thought experiment, if zero immigrants came next year but Britain still built far less than 300,000 homes, the fundamental gap would remain. Indeed, countries with low immigration can still have housing crises (consider Japan’s housing issues despite an aging shrinking population). The housing crunch in the UK predates the recent migration surge – it dates back to the 1980s policy shift and the failure of successive governments to ensure supply kept up with demand. Immigration did add demand, particularly in certain cities, and planning should account for that. But it is not the root cause of Britain’s housing affordability crisis. As long as we focus on blaming immigrants, we risk ignoring the real reforms needed to ensure everyone – newcomers and longtime citizens alike – can have a secure, affordable home.

Economic Analysis Part 3: Cost of Living and Inflation – Global Factors and the Eurozone Effect

Another arena where frustrations often target immigrants is the cost of living. In recent years Britain has experienced a squeeze: prices of essentials like food, energy, and rent climbed faster than incomes. Some argue that immigrants strain public resources or push up prices. However, the drivers of inflation and living costs are overwhelmingly global or domestic-economic, not tied to migration. Additionally, within Europe, economic disparities – especially following the introduction of the Euro single currency – have spurred migration flows to the UK, but those flows were symptoms of economic divides, not causes of UK inflation.

UK Inflation and Living Costs: In the early 2020s, UK inflation spiked to levels not seen in 40 years (peaking around 11% in 2022). The primary causes were global: a surge in post-pandemic demand, supply chain disruptions, and the war in Ukraine driving up energy prices. The cost-of-living crisis hit many countries. In Britain’s case, some unique factors added fuel. A notable one is Brexit – the increased trade frictions after leaving the EU have directly raised import costs. For example, a 2022 study by the LSE found that Brexit-induced trade barriers led to about a 6% increase in UK food prices overallindependent.co.ukindependent.co.uk. In other words, British households are paying significantly more at the supermarket partly due to new customs paperwork, checks, and broken supply chains – not because immigrants are buying all the food. Inflation in housing (rents) stems from the supply issues discussed earlier, and inflation in services can be linked to worker shortages (ironically, worsened by a fall in EU migrant labor in sectors like trucking, farming and hospitality post-Brexit). So in some cases, fewer immigrants contributed to higher prices (for instance, produce rotting in fields due to lack of migrant farmworkers can make food pricier). The cost of living crisis has complex roots in international economics and policy choices; pointing at immigrants does nothing to address energy costs or supply chain bottlenecks.

Public Services and Fiscal Impact: Another aspect of cost-of-living is access to public services (health, education, welfare). Here the narrative often goes that immigrants “clog up” the NHS or claim benefits, leaving less for everyone else. In reality, migrants tend to be net contributors to public finances – most are of working age, come to work or study, and pay taxes. Studies consistently show EU migrants, for example, contributed more in taxes than they took out in benefits on average. Yes, population growth means we need more investment in schools, GP clinics, etc., but austerity – not immigration – is what strained these services. The UK government chose to cut funding drastically in the 2010s, reducing per-capita spending. Blaming migrants for queues in hospitals ignores the fact that many migrants are the doctors and nurses keeping the NHS running. The Covid pandemic made this vividly clear, with immigrant key workers on the frontlines. Cost of living, in terms of getting decent services for your tax money, is impacted by government spending decisions far more than by who your neighbor is.

The Eurozone Factor – Migration as an Effect of Economic Divergence: When discussing immigration in the UK, we must consider Europe’s economic context. The creation of the Euro single currency in 1999 tied disparate economies into one monetary system. While the UK stayed with the pound, many EU countries joined the euro. This had unintended consequences: weaker economies in Southern Europe could no longer devalue their currency to respond to recessions, leading to prolonged high unemployment. After the 2008 financial crisis, countries like Spain, Greece, and Italy suffered deep downturns. Youth unemployment in Spain, for instance, hit a staggering 60% around 2013lacuna.org.uk. Facing a lack of jobs at home, hundreds of thousands of young Spaniards, Italians, and Greeks looked abroad for work – many to Germany and some to the UK (which, though outside the euro, was recovering faster and had an flexible labor market). Similarly, earlier in the 2000s, when Eastern European countries joined the EU, their far lower wages (a legacy of post-communist economies) prompted many to migrate westward for better opportunities. In both cases, migration was essentially a pressure valve for economic imbalances: the euro’s one-size-fits-all monetary policy helped Germany and northern Europe but left southern economies struggling, sending workers abroad; the EU’s expansion allowed Polish plumbers and Romanian builders to fill labor shortages in Britain while earning more than they could back home.

It’s important to see that intra-European migration was driven by economic divides, not the other way around. Free movement of people in the EU is meant to even out some of these disparities – workers move to where jobs are, and some eventually return with new skills or capital. From the UK’s perspective, the influx of EU workers in the 2004–2015 period was a boon for many employers and likely raised GDP slightly, but it also coincided with stagnant wages for reasons we discussed (mainly unrelated to migration). Meanwhile, the structural flaws of the Eurozone and lack of EU-wide fiscal transfers meant places like rural Romania or crisis-hit Spain couldn’t hold onto all their talent. Britain gained from this brain drain with youthful, educated migrants contributing to our economy. Brexit ended the easy exchange of labor, but didn’t solve any underlying economic woes in the UK or Europe. If anything, Britain is now facing labor shortages in key sectors without an EU labor pool to tap, which can push up prices.

In summary, the cost-of-living issues Britons face – whether it’s pricey groceries, energy bills, or rents – have little to do with immigration. They have much to do with global market forces, domestic policy, and regional economic structures. Tackling inflation means addressing energy policy and trade frictions (perhaps re-aligning with EU trade rules to ease costs). Tackling service shortfalls means investing in capacity (training more nurses, building more homes). None of these solutions are advanced by vilifying immigrants. On the contrary, immigrants are often part of the solution: contributing to the workforce, starting businesses, and even supporting an aging population’s pension system with their taxes. The Eurozone story is a caution that without balancing growth across regions, migration flows are a natural result – and those flows can be positive if managed and planned for, rather than treated as a crisis.

The Politics of Blame: How Migration is Framed in Times of Crisis

Economic facts are one thing, but public perception is another. Throughout UK history, periods of economic stress and social change have often coincided with a rise in anti-immigrant rhetoric. Politicians and media outlets have framed migration as the convenient culprit for problems ranging from unemployment to crime to cultural erosion. This section explores how those narratives are constructed – and how they divert attention from deeper issues.

Figure: Protesters in London’s “Stand Up to Racism” march (2017) countering xenophobia. In difficult times, migrants are frequently scapegoated for societal problems, prompting activists and citizens to push back against racist or divisive rhetoric.

A Pattern Repeats: When the economy falters or inequality rises, rather than blame abstract forces or policy failures, leaders throughout history have found it easier to blame “the other”. In Britain, this was seen as early as the late 19th century (Irish migrants in industrial cities) and early 20th (Jewish refugees maligned in the 1930s). A notorious example came in 1968, amid anxieties about rapid Commonwealth immigration and social integration: MP Enoch Powell delivered his “Rivers of Blood” speech, predicting violence and national suicide if immigration continued unchecked. Powell’s lurid imagery (he quoted a constituent warning “in this country in 15 or 20 years’ time the black man will have the whip hand over the white man”) tapped into fears of economic competition and cultural change. Although Powell was sidelined politically after that, his words struck a chord with portions of the public and set the template for a strain of anti-immigrant populism – presenting immigrants as an existential threat to the British way of life. Notably, Powell spoke just as Britain was entering the turbulent 1970s: inflation was rising, jobs were becoming scarcer, and some Britons found it convenient to believe that expelling immigrants would restore stability.

In the 1970s downturn, explicit far-right movements like the National Front gained traction by exploiting high unemployment and blaming immigrants (particularly Asians and Afro-Caribbeans) for “stealing jobs” or diluting British culture. Slogans like “Send them back” were common at NF rallies. This was a period when actual immigration was low, but the idea of immigration became a lightning rod. Such rhetoric inflamed racial tensions, leading to incidents of violence against minority communities. Yet, it did nothing to create jobs or tame inflation – those problems persisted due to oil shocks and industrial strife, not the relatively small immigrant population. By the late 1970s, anti-fascist groups and the broader public rejected the NF’s politics of hate, but the scapegoating cycle would recur.

Media Amplification: Fast forward to the 2000s and 2010s, and one can see many newspapers and politicians following a similar script. During the austerity years after 2010, tabloids routinely ran stories portraying immigrants as welfare cheats, health tourists, or criminals, fueling public anger. When economic growth was slow and wages stagnant, these narratives found a receptive audience. Scholars have noted that media discourse in the UK often reinforces a rigid “us vs. them” dichotomy – for example, by obsessively distinguishing “legal” vs “illegal” migrants and portraying the latter not as human beings but as a faceless hordeein.org.ukein.org.uk. A recent academic study (University of Birmingham, 2025) analyzed thousands of newspaper articles and found that coverage overwhelmingly focused on small boat crossings in the English Channel, framing them as a “political crisis” and even using dehumanizing languageein.org.uk. This despite the fact that the majority of irregular migrants in the UK are actually people who overstayed visas, not those arriving on boats. The government’s response – the 2023 Illegal Migration Act – doubled down on the “us vs them” framing, essentially criminalizing asylum seekers and branding them as invaders to be deterredein.org.uk. Such framing creates an “illusion of control” by fixating on numbers (targets for net migration, counts of boat arrivals) as if managing those numbers is the key to prosperityein.org.uk.

Consider Home Secretary Suella Braverman’s comments in late 2022, when she described the arrival of asylum seekers on the southern coast as an “invasion” of England – unprecedented language by a British ministerkcl.ac.ukindependent.co.uk. This came on the heels of a firebomb attack on a migrant processing center, illustrating how dangerous such rhetoric can be. By invoking words like “invasion” or previously “swarms” (a term used by David Cameron in 2015), officials cast vulnerable refugees as a hostile enemy. The timing is telling: these comments came as the government faced criticism for economic hardships and chaotic public services (post-Covid). Instead of a conversation about, say, why housing and energy costs were spiraling, the focus shifted to a manufactured emergency around a few tens of thousands of Channel crossers – a classic diversion.

Narrative vs Reality: It’s important to note that for all the negative portrayal, immigration to the UK has also been accompanied by positive narratives at times. Politicians of various stripes have acknowledged migrants’ contributions – the NHS would collapse without foreign-born staff; universities and tech firms thrive due to international talent. After the Brexit vote, even as official policy hardened, public opinion in some respects became more appreciative of immigrants (perhaps seeing the labour shortages that resulted when they left). Yet, whenever there is a convenient scapegoat needed, the specter of the “foreign other” is raised. During the Covid economic fallout and the 2022 inflation spike, one saw increased blaming of overseas causes (China, globalism, etc.) and immigrants at home. Both major parties started talking about tightening immigration, despite the clear economic need for workers. This shows how entrenched the migration blame-game is: it survives even when evidence contradicts it.

Another element is how crime and social problems get linked to immigration in discourse. For instance, grooming gangs or terrorism – issues with complex causes – are sometimes simplistically ascribed to immigrant communities, stirring fear. This extends to cultural anxieties: any strain on national identity or social cohesion can be politically leveraged by pointing at newcomers as not “integrating” or as undermining “British values.” Such arguments often surface during times of rapid change or uncertainty, when people are seeking something (or someone) to blame for their unease.

In sum, the narrative framing of migration in Britain has often been a story of deflection: deflecting anger from leaders to migrants, from systemic failings to easy targets. This pattern repeats in cycles, especially in hard times. It takes moral courage and clarity to break the cycle and insist on evidence-based discussion. Encouragingly, civil society – from anti-racism marches to migrant rights organizations – continuously works to inject humanity and facts into the conversation (as pictured above, with Britons rallying for unity and against scapegoating). The challenge is ensuring that the public isn’t misled into fighting symptoms (immigration) while the underlying disease (inequality, poor planning, etc.) goes untreated.

International Comparison: Germany After Reunification – A Different Approach to Large-Scale Migration

To put the UK’s experience in context, it’s helpful to compare it with other instances of large population movements. One notable example is Germany following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the reunification of East and West Germany in 1990. While this was migration within one country, it involved millions of people relocating and posed huge economic and social challenges. How Germany handled this mass internal migration offers lessons in addressing disparities without scapegoating.

The Scale of Movement: When East Germany (the former communist GDR) merged into West Germany, about 16 million East Germans gained freedom of movement to the much more prosperous West. The income gap and employment opportunities between the two halves were vast, so many East Germans chose to move west in search of a better life. Over the next few decades, an estimated 4 million East Germans (mostly young and skilled) migrated to western Germanyaa.com.tr. This was roughly a quarter of the East’s population. At the same time, some West Germans moved east for investment or public service jobs (around 2.8 million moves West→East)aa.com.tr, but that flow was smaller. The net result was a significant depopulation of the East – East German towns lost working-age people, birth rates fell, and communities faced decline. By 2017, the East’s population share had dropped from 22% to 19% of Germany’s totalaa.com.tr. Entire villages emptied out and cities like Berlin saw neighborhoods swell with new arrivals from the East.

For West Germany, this influx was like a sudden wave of migrants arriving – except they were fellow Germans with full citizenship. One might imagine if this were framed negatively, there could have been resentment: “they are coming to take our jobs, our housing”. And indeed, the reunification period was economically bumpy; West Germany had to absorb high unemployment from the East and pour money into revitalization. However, crucially, the dominant narrative in Germany was solidarity rather than scapegoating. The West recognized the migration as a consequence of decades of division and under-investment in the East. Instead of demonizing Easterners for coming, the German government and society largely understood the need to lift up the East so fewer people would feel forced to leave in the first place.

Policy Response – Investment, Not Incrimination: Germany implemented massive aid and investment programs for East Germany. The most famous is the “Solidaritätszuschlag” or Solidarity Surcharge – essentially a reunification tax. Starting in 1991, all German taxpayers paid an extra levy (initially 7.5%, later 5.5% of their income tax) dedicated to rebuilding the Eastbundesregierung.de. This raised billions of euros annually for infrastructure, business subsidies, and social support in Eastern regions. The logic was simple: if the East’s economy improves, fewer people will leave, and those who left might even return. This policy was a form of structural honesty – acknowledging the real cause (regional economic weakness) and addressing it with resources – rather than pretending the migrations themselves were the root problem. Over 30 years, more than €2 trillion has been transferred to the East in various forms. Today, the solidarity tax is being phased out for most taxpayers, but it had a long run, signifying a long-term commitment to balanced development.

Despite these efforts, East Germany still lags the West in many indicators and the population loss has not fully reversed (only by 2017 did net migration between East-West level out to zerodemographic-research.org). But importantly, West Germans did not blame Eastern migrants for the early 1990s recession or social challenges. There was some friction, yes – jokes about “Ossis” (Easterners) being lazy or “Wessis” being arrogant – but nothing like the hostility seen in other contexts because they were viewed as part of one nation’s family. Compare this to the UK: when confronted with deindustrialization in the north of England or in Wales, did Britain launch a comparable regional investment surge? Not to the same extent – instead, many communities were left to decline, and some politicians later blamed immigrants for the resulting despair.

Other Examples of Large Flows: Germany’s example extends beyond East-West internal migration. In 2015, during the refugee crisis, Germany under Angela Merkel took in over 1 million asylum seekers (many from Syria) – a decision that was controversial domestically but was framed by Merkel as “Wir schaffen das” (“We can manage it”). She appealed to humanitarian duty and also to Germany’s strength to integrate newcomers. While there was some backlash (and rise of the AfD party exploiting anti-migrant sentiment), Germany invested heavily in language courses, job training, and housing for refugees. The contrast here is that Germany’s response was to mobilize resources to help integrate migrants, whereas the UK’s instinct around the same time was to restrict numbers (the UK took relatively few Syrians by choice) and focus on deterrence.

Another comparison could be made with a country like Canada, which has a high immigration rate per capita but tends to avoid severe anti-immigrant backlashes by carefully managing integration and framing immigration as key to national growth (Canada actively sells itself as a nation of immigrants). The public discourse there is generally more positive, and newcomers are seen as future Canadians rather than eternal outsiders. Of course, Canada doesn’t face the same scale of irregular migration as Europe, but it shows how framing and policy design can maintain public support.

Lessons for the UK: What these comparisons teach us is that context and framing matter hugely. Germany’s Eastern migrants and Canada’s newcomers were not viewed purely as a burden – they were seen as people to be included, with systemic solutions to make inclusion work. The UK, on the other hand, has often tried to avoid systemic solutions (like investing in housing or deprived regions) and then looked for someone to blame when problems emerge. The Germany reunification case in particular highlights that when large population movements happen, the answer is not to vilify the movers, but to address the push-pull factors. East Germans left because East Germany needed rebuilding – so Germany rebuilt it (and continues to, albeit unevenly). People from poorer EU countries came to the UK because of opportunity – it would make sense to invest in skills and infrastructure both in the UK (to handle growth) and, through foreign aid or cooperation, in source countries (so migration is by choice, not desperation).

In conclusion, the international perspective shows that migration challenges can be met with solidarity and sound policy instead of scapegoating. That doesn’t mean it’s easy or that Germany handled everything perfectly (some Eastern regions still feel left behind, fueling their own resentments). But the core idea is to focus on the root causes. If the UK were to apply a similar lens, it would mean recognizing that blaming Polish plumbers or Syrian refugees for our problems is a dead-end. Instead, ask: why are jobs insecure? Why is housing so scarce? Why did we not plan better for increased population? Those questions lead to actionable answers – invest, reform, include – much more than “stop immigration” does.

The "Stop the Boats" Campaign and the Politics of Illegal Immigration

In recent years, few phrases have dominated the UK’s immigration discourse as forcefully as “Stop the Boats.” Championed by government ministers and splashed across press briefings, billboards, and speeches, the slogan presents an image of crisis—of Britain under siege from nameless arrivals crossing the English Channel in small, dangerous vessels.

But slogans are not solutions. And beneath the surface of this rhetoric lies a complex reality that deserves far more careful consideration.

The Reality Behind the Rhetoric

• Small boat crossings have increased in visibility, but they remain a minor component of total migration. The majority of people in the UK without regular immigration status entered legally and overstayed visas—not by crossing water in dinghies.

• Those crossing the Channel are often from conflict zones: Afghanistan, Syria, Iran, Eritrea—places where war, persecution, and instability are rife. Under international law, individuals have the right to claim asylum regardless of how they arrive.

• The “Illegal Migration Act” passed in 2023 seeks to remove and permanently bar those arriving irregularly, even before their asylum claims are assessed. This contravenes the spirit, if not the letter, of the 1951 Refugee Convention, to which the UK is a founding signatory.

But We Don’t Know Who They Are…

One of the most common arguments in support of the crackdown is: “But we don’t know who these people are.”

That may be true in part—documentation is often lost or destroyed during harrowing journeys. But this uncertainty is not a justification for criminalising people by default. A lack of papers doesn’t equate to a lack of humanity, nor does it justify presuming criminal intent.

The reality is that most people seeking refuge are fleeing criminals, not attempting to join them. Many are professionals, students, parents, or children hoping for stability, not subversion. The burden of proof should remain with the state, not the accused, and yet the public narrative often flips this principle.

Fear, Crime, and the Media

We often hear that illegal immigrants commit crime. Occasionally, news stories emerge—about stabbings, trafficking, or antisocial behaviour—and are tied to immigration status. These stories circulate fast, feeding fear.

But we rarely ask:

• How many undocumented migrants actually commit crimes?

• How does that compare to UK nationals, or to crime rates overall?

• Is one anecdotal story representative of an entire group?

The truth is, most crime in the UK is committed by UK-born citizens. And there’s no reliable evidence that migrants—legal or undocumented—commit more crime per capita than others. In fact, some studies suggest immigrants are less likely to commit crime than the native-born population. But the media amplification of the few exceptions distorts public perception.

This distortion is deliberate. When times are hard, a frightened population is easier to control. Fear is a powerful tool.

A Manufactured Emergency

The “Stop the Boats” campaign does not meaningfully address the causes of irregular migration—war, climate collapse, economic collapse, and sometimes Britain’s own foreign policy. Nor does it target the real villains: the smuggling gangs and exploitative networks who profit off desperation.

What it does do is redirect public frustration away from broken economic systems, austerity, housing failure, and wage stagnation—onto the most vulnerable.

“We don’t know who they are” is not an excuse to deny people rights. It’s a reason to treat them as human beings and learn their story.

Reframing the Question: Systemic Economic Issues vs. a “Migration Crisis”

At this point, it’s clear that many problems attributed to immigration in the UK are in fact home-grown or global in nature. So, we must reframe the core question away from “Is immigration the problem?” toward “What are the real problems, and how did they get reframed as an immigration crisis?”

The evidence shows that the UK’s stagnating wages, housing crunch, and strained services are primarily the result of policy choices and economic trends: the embrace of neoliberal deregulation, disinvestment in public goods, austerity cuts, and failures to anticipate societal needs. However, rather than confront these tough issues, successive governments and parts of the media have often opted to repackage them as issues of immigration. This reframing serves a political purpose: it provides a clear, simple “cause” (foreigners!) and therefore a simple solution (stop them!) – even though it’s largely a false narrative.

Let’s break down some core issues and how they’ve been mislabeled:

• Issue: Wage inequality and job insecurity due to casualization of labor, weakening of unions, and outsourcing. Reframed as: “Foreign workers undercutting British wages” or “EU migrants taking all the jobs.” This framing ignores how domestic labor laws (like zero-hour contracts) and declining collective bargaining have eroded job quality. It’s easier to say “British jobs for British workers” than to raise the minimum wage or enforce labor rights – yet the latter are the real fixes for low wages. Meanwhile, politicians rarely mention that even if immigration fell, companies could still offshore jobs or automate them. The honest discussion would focus on how to create good jobs and training for all – immigrant or not – rather than imagining a closed economy.

• Issue: Housing shortage from lack of building and speculative investment. Reframed as: “Too many immigrants, not enough houses.” As discussed, this is a misdirection. A decade of near-zero interest rates made property an investment magnet, driving prices up; social housing was sold off by policy; construction sector productivity is low. But the populist refrain became controlling immigration to ease housing demand. Indeed, after Brexit some argued house prices would finally fall if EU migration dropped – in reality, house prices rose sharply through 2020-2022 due to cheap mortgages and wealth inequality. An honest reframing is: how do we regulate our housing market and build enough homes? That leads to solutions like planning reform, taxing empty homes, massive building programs – again, complicated tasks that require political will, unlike the simplistic scapegoating of migrants.

• Issue: Strain on public services from budget cuts and poor planning. Reframed as: “Health tourism” or “immigrants clogging schools and hospitals.” The facts show the NHS has consistently relied on immigrant staff and that many migrants are young (thus low healthcare users). When A&E queues grow, it correlates with winter flu seasons and funding shortfalls, not immigration spikes. Reframing properly would mean admitting, for example, that if we want an aging society to be cared for, we may actually need more immigrants (since our domestic birth rate is low and we face worker shortages in care). The so-called “pressure” narrative often cited – that migrants are putting unsustainable pressure on servicesein.org.uk – flips cause and effect: pressure exists because we haven’t expanded and invested in capacity. Immigrants are being used as a pressure valve and then blamed for the pressure. A truthful narrative would center on shared investment: each additional person, whether born here or abroad, contributes something (taxes, talents) and uses something (services), and smart governance balances the two.

• Issue: Cultural anxieties and community change. Reframed as: “Immigrants won’t integrate; they change our neighborhoods.” This is more intangible but often underpins the others. It speaks to identity. Yet Britain has seen wave after wave of integration – Huguenots, Jews, Caribbeans, South Asians, Eastern Europeans – each initially met with skepticism, each now woven into the national fabric. The real issue is often fear of the unknown or rapid change, which is understandable, but solvable through engagement, education, and inclusive narratives. Instead, demagogues reframe it as an invasion or loss of national identity, which can be very potent emotionally. The alternative framing would emphasize Britain’s history as a diverse, plural nation, the strength that comes from that, and enforce standards for everyone to uphold values of liberty and mutual respect. It’s about emphasizing common humanity and the rule of law (e.g., punish criminal behavior regardless of who does it, but don’t stigmatize an entire migrant group for the actions of a few).

By reframing the discussion, we highlight that the “crisis” is not immigration per se – it is the failure to address structural economic problems that affect both natives and immigrants. Unaffordable housing, low wages, regional disparities, stressed infrastructure – these would exist even in a zero-immigration scenario, as long as policy remains as is. Indeed, countries with near-zero net immigration, like Japan, face severe issues of stagnation and demographic decline, which bring their own crises.

It’s also instructive to see how when migrants are no longer available to blame (say, during Covid when migration plummeted), the same problems persisted or even worsened: worker shortages, supply chain issues, inflation – proving it wasn’t immigration driving them. As one commentator quipped, Britain could “concrete over the countryside” with housing developments and still have a shortage if policies don’t change, and likewise “if the UK closed the borders tomorrow, there would still be a housing crisis.”iea.org.uk The logical conclusion is that immigration was a scapegoat, not the root cause.

All this is not to say immigration poses zero challenges. Rapid population growth does require expanding schools, housing, etc., and local impacts need managing (for instance, specific towns that saw very sudden influxes did experience pressure on GP surgeries until funding caught up). But those are management issues, not reasons to demonize migrants. If we treat immigration as a natural part of a globalized world – something to be harnessed for mutual benefit – we can then calmly plan: e.g., if X thousand more people will move to city Y, then build Z new homes and ensure training for more doctors. These are practical responses, far removed from the emotional panic of “stop the influx!”

Reframing the core question, then, we ask: How can the UK address its systemic economic issues in a way that maintains social cohesion and upholds human dignity? The answer lies in turning attention squarely to those systemic issues and dropping the pretence that curbing immigration is a silver bullet. It means being honest about what’s broken in our economic model. Such honesty can be freeing – it allows us to see immigrants not as harbingers of doom but as fellow humans who are part of the solution, or at least not the source of the problem.

Toward Solutions of Economic Dignity and Social Cohesion

“Is immigration actually the problem in the UK?” After this exploration, the answer should be evident: No – immigration is not the fundamental problem. The challenges facing the UK are largely home-grown or global, and they demand honest, structural solutions. Scapegoating immigrants offers a false shortcut that leads nowhere. It is time to shift our focus from blaming “them” to fixing what’s within our power to change.

A policy-oriented path forward would start by affirming principles of human dignity, fairness, and shared prosperity. That means recognizing migrants as people with rights and aspirations, not as convenient targets for our frustrations. It also means holding our leaders accountable for the state of the nation – we must ask what policies will raise wages, build houses, and improve lives, rather than accepting easy answers that it’s someone else’s fault.

Here are some key reform areas and how they address the real issues:

• Invest in Communities and Infrastructure: The UK should embark on a renewed program of building – not just housing (though building at least the 300,000 homes per year the government targets is crucial), but also hospitals, schools, transport, and green energy. This creates jobs, boosts productivity, and benefits everyone. It eases the feeling of scarcity that feeds resentment. If people see their town getting better – new clinics, better roads, more affordable homes – they are less likely to worry that newcomers will overwhelm the place. This approach echoes the solidarity shown in post-unification Germany: invest where it’s needed. It’s an investment in social cohesion as much as in concrete and steel.
  
  

• Strengthen Labor Rights and Wage Growth: To restore economic dignity, workers must have the power to secure fair wages and conditions. Policies could include raising the minimum wage to a genuine living wage, encouraging or mandating collective bargaining in sectors, cracking down on exploitative employment (so that no group of workers, domestic or migrant, can be used to undercut standards), and upgrading skills training for British workers. When workers feel secure – that they can earn a decent living – the appeal of anti-immigrant populism (which often preys on job insecurity) diminishes. Migrants should be seen as complementing the workforce, not threatening it. Indeed, with proper enforcement of labor standards, a migrant and a local worker would be on a level playing field, preventing any race to the bottom.
  
  

• Fair and Smart Immigration Policy: Rather than swinging between “open door” and “closed door”, the UK needs a balanced immigration policy aligned with economic needs and humanitarian obligations. That means creating legal, safe routes for the immigration we want – for instance, health care visas to staff the NHS, seasonal farmworker programs to ensure crops are harvested, and international student opportunities that bolster our universities (while allowing graduates to stay and contribute). Simultaneously, it means having a humane but firm asylum system: processing asylum claims efficiently, offering refuge to those in genuine need (as per international law), and working with European partners to manage flows in a way that is orderly. Crucially, the narrative around policy should be that migrants are part of “us”. They are future Britons, colleagues, neighbors. With integration support (language classes, orientation, community programs), cohesion is achievable. Government officials should lead in de-escalating rhetoric – no more talk of invasions or floods, but rather practical talk of how to integrate and accommodate newcomers responsibly. This tamping down of fear can itself improve outcomes, as communities won’t be on edge.
  
  

• Address Regional Inequalities: A lot of anti-immigrant sentiment in England, as evidenced in the Brexit vote, came from regions that feel left behind (post-industrial North East, coastal towns, etc.). It’s vital to regenerate these areas with meaningful jobs and hope. If a young person in Sunderland or Blackpool has a good job, affordable home, and prospects, they are far less likely to be swayed by claims that immigration is their enemy. Rebalancing the economy (for example, investing in green industries in the North, or tech hubs beyond London) and empowering local governments with funding can create a sense that everyone has a stake in the country’s future. Social cohesion arises when all communities see themselves as respected and heard.
  
  

• Public Discourse and Education: Finally, combating scapegoating requires changing the conversation. Political leaders, media, and citizens all have a role. Leaders need to practice structural honesty – acknowledge the real causes of problems even when that requires admitting past mistakes or complexities. Media should be called out for misleading portrayals; press watchdogs and public broadcasters can help ensure more balanced coverage (for instance, reporting the context that net migration adds to GDP or that asylum numbers are far lower than public perception). Schools can include curricula on the history of migration, so young people understand how interwoven it is with British history – from the Normans to the Windrush generation. When people see immigrants as fellow humans with stories, rather than statistics, empathy grows. Community initiatives that bring people together – cultural festivals, dialogues – can break down the “us vs them” mindset. Ultimately, fairness must be the guiding value: fairness in economic opportunities and fairness in how we treat one another.
  
  

In reframing and addressing the issue, we should remember that migration, at its heart, is a human story. People move to improve their lives or escape danger. Those motives aren’t alien to Britons – millions of British emigrants have done the same over the centuries. So there is a moral dimension: scapegoating migrants not only fails to solve our problems, it also erodes our moral fabric by turning the vulnerable into enemies. A society that upholds dignity will strive to help its own disadvantaged and extend compassion to newcomers.

The UK stands at a crossroads. We can continue down the path of division – one marked by ever harsher immigration crackdowns, increasingly angry public debate, and persistent economic malaise (because the real issues go unaddressed). Or we can choose a path of renewal and unity: tackle the root causes of our challenges and embrace the contributions of those who come here. Choosing the latter is not just in the interest of migrants – it is in the interest of Britain’s future. A confident, forward-looking Britain would see immigration not as a threat, but as an opportunity to inject youth, skills, and diversity into the nation, while doubling down on fixing housing, wages, and services for the benefit of all.

In conclusion, immigration has been the wrong scapegoat for the UK’s problems. The real adversaries are inequality, poor planning, and short-term political thinking. By confronting those, and by viewing immigrants as partners in our society rather than problems, the UK can build a more prosperous, fair, and cohesive future. The road to get there requires integrity in our analysis and compassion in our policies – qualities that, when combined, can ensure that the phrase “economic dignity” applies to every person living in Britain, no matter where they were born.

Sources:

• Historical migration trends and net migration dataresearchbriefings.files.parliament.ukresearchbriefings.files.parliament.ukcommonslibrary.parliament.ukfullfact.org

• ONS and government reports on migration levels (e.g., net migration 2015, 2022)ons.gov.ukspectator.co.uk

• Analysis of wage stagnation causes: Bank of England and academic findings on weak union power and small migration effectier.org.ukier.org.ukmigrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk

• Housing crisis data: house price vs earnings growth, housing shortfallmigration.greenparty.org.ukmigration.greenparty.org.uk; arguments debunking migrants as causemigration.greenparty.org.ukiea.org.uk

• Brexit and cost of living: effect on food pricesindependent.co.uk

• Eurozone impact: Spanish youth unemployment and exoduslacuna.org.uk

• Media and political narrative researchein.org.ukein.org.ukein.org.uk

• Germany reunification migration and solidarity policiesaa.com.trbundesregierung.de

• Commentary on immigration scapegoating vs real issuesiea.org.uk